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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the
interest of
P.L.L.

Case No. 15947

a person under 18 years
of age.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 'l'HE CASE
This is an appeal by the natural mother from an
Order of the First District Juvenile Court for Weber
County, Utah, Judge L. Kent Bachman presiding, entered
on June 22, 1978, permanently lerminaling all parental
rights of appellant in connection with her child, P.L.L.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On June 22, 1978, the juvenile court found appellant
to be incompetent by reason of conduct or condition
seriously detrimental to her child, and ordered that
the parental rights of Mary Ellen Lavine, the appellant
herein, be permanently terminated.

(R.8l).

The court

further ordered that the child be placed in the custody
of the Utah State Division of Family Services.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the juvenile court's
order terminating parental rights.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's Statement of Facts
with the following exceptions and additions:
1.

The child, P.L.L.,was placed in the custody

of the Division of Family Services at birth by order of
the juvenile court dated July 18, 1973.

(R.2).

The

child's physicial condition, coupled with the doctor's
conviction that the mother was incapable of providing
proper care resulted in Division of Family Service
custody frorn the time of the child's birth.

(TR. 118) .

It was not the child' s condition alone as appellant
asserts.
2.

(Appellant's Brief, p.2).
The visitations which were arranqed by Mr.

Mullens (Appellant's Brief, p.2) took place at the
Division of Family Services office, because Mr. t1ullens
did not consider appellant's living quarters appropriate
for a child.
3.

(TR. 71-72).

Appellant's statement on page 3 of her brief

regarding visitations arranged by Ms. Rowe is noticeably
undetailed.

The record reflects, in detail, all of the

visits arranged by Ms. Rowe.

In actuality, only the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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first three-hour visit on August 1, 1974, was recorded
without problems (TR. 86).

Afterward, when Ms. Rowe

allowed visits for longer periods of time, the record
is replete with resulting problems.
The first overnight visit took place on August 6-7,
1974.

When Ms. Rowe delivered the baby to the mother,

she instructed her on the proper way to feed the baby,
emphasizing the special problems created by the cleft
pallat, how to bathe and clothe her, and what time the
child should be put to bed.

(TR. 89).

When Ms. Rowe

picked up the child the next day, the baby had a hard
sucker in her mouth, had not been bathed, had not been
cleaned after diaper changes, and had not been put
to bed until 3:00a.m.

(TR. 88-90).

A second overnight visit was arranged on August 2728, 1974.

When Ms. Rowe returned to pick up the child,

the baby was very tired, her hair was matted together
with a stickly substance, her nose had run and dried
all over her face, and she appeared not to have been
bathed.

(TR.91).

Upon return to the foster home, the

child was wheezing and coughing, and her nightgown in
her suitcase was found to be soaking wet and filthy.
(TR. 92).

Again, the mother had been instructed on how

to care for the child.

(TR. 91).
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After the third visit, the child had on dirty
underclothes and was tired.

(TR. 93).

When Ms. Rowe next went to the appellant's house,
she found it in a state of complete filth, as described
in the transcript at pages 94-95.
After instruction and prodding by Ms. Rowe, the
appellant managed to clean up the house (TR. 96), and
Ms. Rowe agreed to allow a week long visit which
commenced on October 22, 1974.

Two days later Ms. Rowe

returned to find the baby very dirty and the house
malodorous, with spilled garbage all over.

(TR. 97-98).

After a four-day visit in November, 1974, Ms. Rowe
did

no~

find the baby at the appellant's house when

she went to pick her up.

(TR. 101).

She located her

at her maternal grandmother's, and found her to be
subdued and somewhat melancholy.

(TR. 102).

From the record detailing the visits arranged by
Ms. Rowe, it appears that almost all were "less than
successful," as stated by appellant at page 3 of her
brief.
4.

Appellant's conclusion that the quality of care

provided by the mother improved considerably subsequent
to her attendance at parenting classes is not supported
by the record.

The child was dirty after a visjt on

January 13, 1975 (TR. 103), and was tired and djrty
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after an overnight visit on March 29-31, 1975.

(TR.

104).
5.

Appellant's assertion on page 5 that by

December 9, 1975, active steps were being taken by Ms.
Gearhart to terminate parental rights is a misstatement
of the facts.

At that point, Ms. Gearhart had only decided

to explore termination as a possible alternative in this
case.

(TR. 155).
6.

The appellant refrains from giving the reason

that Ms. Gearhart stopped the child's visits with her
grandparents.

(Appellant's Brief, p.7).

After the child

had undergone surgery for the cleft pallat, Ms. Gearhart
attempted to take the child for a visit with the grandparents.

When they pulled up in front of the grandparents'

house, the child became extremely upset and threw a
tantrum, crying and screaming very loudly.

(TR. 145).

Ms. Gearhart felt that such emotional and physical
exertion was harmful to the child after having recently
had surgery, so cancelled the visit.

The grandparents

were informed of this and the reasons for it by telephone.
(TR. 145).
7.

The appellant's right to visitation was not

affected in any way by Ms. Gearhart's actions regarding
the grandparents' visits.

Appellant could have requested

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8.

Appellant's Statement of Facts omits any mention

of the facts attested to by the psychologists who were
called as expert witnesses.

Appellant's intelligence

level and capacity would classify her as borderline
mentally retarded.

(TR. 29).

Appellant was diagnosed as

having a passive dependent personality, which means that
she takes a passive stance in life, depending on others
to provide her with the basic necessities of life.

Dr.

Paul T. Furlong testified that with her intellectual
capacities and personality traits, the appellant may
be able to provide basic survival care to a child,
that the child would likely survive but would not
necessarily thrive or be stimulated.

(TR. 42).

Dr.

Richard Grow testified that with training, the appellant
may be able to learn basic survival skills, but no
other more advanced parenting skills.

(TR. 66).

Dr.

Furlong also testified that the appellant lacks the
sophistication and ability to train a child to fit
into society in a reasonably adequate fashion.

(TR. 44).

After a lengthy trial at which the Juvenile Court
judge had the opportunity to hear and weigh all of these
facts, the court found that the appellant "is incompetent
by reason of her condition and conduct which is seriously
detrimental to the child," and ordered that all parental
rights be terminated.

(R. 291-292).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO TESTIFY AS A WITNESS
IN THIS CASE DID NOT VIOLATE HER FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellant characterizes the juvenile court proceeding
in a termination case as "an adult case, and a forfeiture
proceeding of a quasi-criminal nature to which the Fifth
Amendment privileqe against self-incrimination must apply."
(Appellant's Brief, p.7).

However, the denomination of

the proceeding as civil, criminal, adult, or juvenile
is inconsequential for Fifth-Amendment purposes.

It is

well established that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incriminaiton applies to juvenile court proceedings,
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

Further, i t is

not important whether the proceedings are denominated
civil or criminal because the Fifth Amendment privilege
generally applies in either case.
431

u.s.

Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,

801, 805 (1977), citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.

1, 11 (1964), Justice White concurring, in Murphy v. Naterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964).

Therefore

appellant's belabored efforts to categorize action as an
adult proceeding in order to invoke application of the
Fifth Amendment is unnecessary and moot.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent has some problem with appellant's
characterization of a juvenile court termination proceedin?
as a forfeiture proceeding, although it is an unnecessary
argument for analysis of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Respondent points out that a parent does not have the same
kind of property interest in a child as she would in a
chattel.

As was discussed by a federal district court in

Organization of Foster Families v. Dumpson, 418 F.Supp.
277, 282 (S.D.!J.Y. 1976), "The time has long siilce pass('d
when children were considered mere chattels of the adults
with whom they lived."

To treat the parent-child

relationship as one would that of a property

owner to

his chattel is to totally overlook the rights of a child
as a person.

(See Point V

, infra.)

There are at least

two individuals with protected rights involved in a
termination proceeding, so it is very unlike a forfeiture
proceeding in nature or purpose.
ih th the fundamental principle that the Fi fth-Amendmer

privilege applies in juvenile court proceedings agreed
upon, it is necessary to evaluate appellant's argument in
terms of whether any error, reversible or otherwise, was
committed in allowing appellant to testify as a witness
in the court below.

-8-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The appellant was represented by counsel at all
relevant stages of the proceedings which
this court now reviews.

Appellant's counsel, Mr.

Hasenyager, generally objected to the calling of the
appellant, Mary Ellen Clark Lavine, to testify as a
witness.

(TR. 195).

However, Ms. Lavine was only a

witness,not a defendant.

A termination action in juvenile

court is a proceeding in regard to the child, not the parent.
The parent is not a defendant as in a criminal case.

It

is only in appellant's brief that there is any assertion
that the purpose of a termination hearing is to place
guilt or find "wrongful" conduct.

The question of a

p2rent's conduct or condition in a termination proceeding
is not to be measured in terms of "right or wrong", but
rather by the effect of that conduct on a child.

The

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does
not allow a witness to refuse to testify altogether.
The general objection by appellant's counsel as to
allowing appellant to testify was properly denied.

(TR.l99).

At the stage of the proceedings when the general
objection was entered, no questions had been put to Mary
Ellen Lavine.

It is well-accepted that the Fifth Amend-

ment privilege does not come into operation until specific
questions are asked, U.S. v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845
(5th
Cir. 1969), General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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481 F.2d 1204 (1973) cert. den. 414 U.S. 1162 (1974),
~v.

Malnik, 489 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974), the answers

to which might later subject the witness to criminal
prosecution.

Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,

805 (1977).
The testimony which appellant gave at the hearing
below produced no evidence which might subject her to
future criminal prosecution.

The attorney for the state,

Mr. Daines, attempted to follow a line of questioning
regarding prostitution.

Counsel for appellant made a

Fifth Amendment objection.

To the extent that the

Juvenile Court allowed this line of questioning, no
evidence came forth which could incriminate or support
future criminal prosecutions of appellant.

(TR. 222-230).

Reference was made to taxes not filed by Mrs. Lavine,
which information might possibly subject her to criminal
liability.

However, no claim of privilege was made to

these questions by either the appellant or her counsel.
It is necessary that a claim of privilege be made since
witnesses may waive their privilege against self-incrimination if it is not asserted.

U.S. v. Mania, 317 U.S.

424, 427 (1943).
There was no valid claim of privileqe in this case.
This court stated in State v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 804,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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(Utah, 1972) that:
An attorney for a witness cannot claim
a privilege against self-incrimination;
he can only advise the witness.
In order
for the claim to be honored by the court,
it must be made by the witness.
Counsel for appellant tried several times to raise a
Fifth Amendment claim of privilege, but appellant never
made such a claim herself.
the appellant to

t0~~ify,

Although the court allowed
there was no

evidence adduced

which could subject appellant to criminal prosecution,
so appellant was not unlawfully required to testify
"against" herself within the meaning of those words.
It is interesting that although appellant makes such
an extensive Fifth Amendment argument in her brief, there
is absolutely no claim that her testimony produced any
evidence which was influential in the court's decision.
The court will note that of the important facts contained
in the Statement of Facts in the briefs of both parties,
no facts adduced from Mrs. Lavine's testimony are included.
The findings and conclusions of the Juvenile Court, as
articulated by Judge Bachman, are not based upon any
information gained from the appellant's testimony.

{R. 81).

Appellant testified only as a witness in the hearing
below.

There

v1as

no evidence obtained from her testimony

which might incriminate her for future criminal proceedings,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and there is not even any indication that her testimony
damaged her in this proceeding.

The court below committed

no reversible error in allowing appellant to testify.

POINT II
APPELLANT l;'l\S GIVEN REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
CORRECT THE INADEQUACIES IN HER ABILITY TO CAPB
FOR HER CHILD.
P.L.L., the minor child involved in this case, is
now over five

year~

old.

She has been in a foster home,

under the custody and supervision of the Division of
Family Services, since her birth.

For over four years

the Division of Family Services worked with the mother
to provide opportunity for her to learn how to care and
provide for her child.

Numerous home visits were arranged

between mother and child, and the motP.er was instructed
on the very basic necessities of how to care for the child.
Appellant's claims in Point II of her brief that she did
not have the opportunity to improve herself and adequately
prepare herself to receive custody of her child are unfounded.

Only after four years of trying to maintain

the natural parent-child relationship did the Division of
Family Services determine that the child's best interests
required a terminat.ion of parental rights.

The appellant

simply cannot clilim that she had insufficient t.ime or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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opportunities to correct the inadequacies in her capacity
to care for P.L.L.
The record shows that there was an extended period of
trial and error during which time the appellant was given
instruction in how to provide basic survival care for her
child.

Most of these incidents are detailed in Respondent's

Statement of Facts.
1.

A brief summary follows:

During the period from July to November, 1973,

the child received medical treatment in the hospital and
then efforts were concentrated on placing her in an
appropriate foster home.
2.

(TR. 69).

When the case was assigned to Mr. Mullens, a

social worker, in November, 1973, he arranged for and
secured psychological evaluations on the appellant to
determine her needs, strengths, and deficiencies.
3.

(TR. 70).

Between November, 1973, and May, 1974, Mr.

Mullens arranged visits between mother and child, which
took place in the offices of the Division of Family
Services because the worker felt uncomfortable about
taking a bahy into appellant's current living quarters.
(TR. 71).

Although several visits were cancelled either

because the baby, the appellant or her husband was ill,
at least four visits did take place.

(TR. 78).

During

at least one of these vistis, the social worker instructed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the appellant on how to feed the baby, pointing out
the special problems caused by the cleft pallat.

He

also demonstrated the feeding method, as he had been
instructed by the doctor.

(TR. 73).

Appellant seemed

able to feed the baby correctly at that time.

Mr.

Mullens testified that the Division's major objective
during the first year of the child's life was to make
sure the child's medical needs were met.
4.

The worker assigned to the case between May and

July, 1974, was not called to testify, but the record
does indicate that several visits were arranged during
that time.
5.

(TR.l07-108).

On August 6, 1974, the child was delivered to

the mother with specific instructions on feeding, bathing
and bedtime with emphasis regarding the child's cleft
pallat and special feeding needs.

(TR. 89).

On August 7,

when the child was picked up by the social worker, she
has a hard Sugar Daddy sucker in her mouth, was dirty,
and had not been put to bed until 3:00 a.m.

(TR. 88-90).

The child was just one year old.
6.

On August 27, 1974, the child was delivered to

the mother, again

with specific instructions regarding

the simple necessities of bathing, feeding, and bedtiQe.
The child was returned very dirty, tired, and improperly
clothed.

(TR. 91).
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7.

During a week long visit in October, 1974, the

social worker had to keep almost a constant surveillance
to insure that the child was cleaned and the house didn't
fall into a state of filth.

(TR. 97-98).

Again, the

social worker, Ms. Rowe, testified that she gave the
same basic instructions to appellant at the beginning of
each visit.

(TR. 109), and asked appellant if she under-

stood or to repeat the instructions.

(TR. 110).

Nonethe-

luss, appellant continued to perform inadequately and th2
child was returned in unsatisfactory condition.
In the fall of 1974, the Division of Family Services
referred the appellant to the Skills Center of Neber County
Mental Health for the purpose of attending parenting
classes and receiving specialized instruction in parenting
skills.

(TR. 113).

to participants.

Such classes are provided at no cost
Even after appellant had reportedly

attended such parenting classes for several months (TR. 113),
she still failed to adequately perform the basic function
of bathing and keeping the baby clean.

(TR. 103, 104).

When Vickie Rowe, the social worker

during much of

1974-75, was asked why she kept trying, she replied that
she kept hoping that with teaching, the mother's parenting
would improve.

(TR. 93).

It c:an hardly be said that no

efforts were made to train the mother, and it was certainly
not unreasonable for the Juvenile Court judge, after hearing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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all the testimony, to conclude that the Division had
afforded the appellant sufficient training and
to learn basic mothering skills.

(TR. 290).

opportuniti~

These efforts

largely failed, and for almost a year and a half, the
appellant didn't even request any more home visits.

(TR. 13;:

She made no efforts then, but takes the position now that
the Division of Family Services must continue for an
indefinite period of time to assist her.
has limited learning capacities.

The appellant

She has not

well even to basic training in survival care.

r~sponced

It would be

unfair to the child to keep her in a temporary foster
care situation for years while interminable efforts are
being made to train her mother, especially when the
prognosis is doubtful.
Appellant claims on page 13 of her brief that the most
significant failure of the Division of Family Services
was a failure to extend reasonable efforts of assistance
to appellant to correct her deficiencies prior to filing
a petition for termination of parental rights.

On the

contrary, the Division had kept P.L.L. in foster care
for over four years before filing for termination.

All

of the training and in-home visitations previously discusse
took place before the petition was filed.

During the

last year and a half of the period, appe1lant did not
even request additional in-home visits.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, -16administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The duty of the Division of Family Services to assist
a parent in overcoming her parenting deficiencies, as
articulated by this court in State v. Lance, 464 P.2d
395 (Utah 1970) and State in the Interest of Walter B.,
577 P.2d 119 (Utah 1978), only goes so far.
In State in Interest of Mario A., 514 P.2d 797
(Utah 1973), this court said that:
"We do not think caseworkers are obligated
to go to the extremes which appellant claims
they should have done in order to kindle
and increase a small flame of desire to be
reunited with her children." 514 P.2d at
799.
In the present case, the Division of Family Services
did make reasonable efforts over an extended period
of time to aid the appellant and provide her with
opportunities to maintain her parent-child relationship.
However, at some point the Division's duty to protect
the best interests of the child must take over, and the
Division must take approprinte steps to provide the child
with a stable, stimulating family environment.
Appellant submits that "the capacity to provide
basic survival care is in itself sufficient to defeat a
termination petition."

(Appellant's Brief, p.l4).

First

of all, the record indicates that appellant did not
demonstrate a significant capacity to provide even basic
survival care.

Even if she had such capacity, it would
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not be sufficient in and of itself to defeat the terminatiw
petition.
In the most recent case decided by this court regardina
termination of parental rights, State in the Interest of
R.J., H.J., and D.J.,

(Dec. 15, 1978, No. 15386), the

mother was found to be "unable to provide an environment
which would stimulate intellectual or emotional growth
in her children."

(Dec. 15, 1978, p.2).

It was also

found that "neither parent has been able to respond to or
cooperate in assistance offered by Social Services over
a period of several years."

Id.

This court affirmed

the Juvenile Court's judgment that:
•.. [T)he natural parents are socially and
emotionally retarded and unable or unwilling
to psychologically, emotionally, and/or
socially stimulate the above children to
the degree that they are failing to develop
properly and said failure is seriously detrimental to the welfare of said children. Id.
Thus, this court has recognized that children require
more than basic survival care.

They also require and

deserve at least some degree of intellectual, emotional,
and social stimulation.
A recent case in the Virgin Islands, In re Maria,
Elisa, and Norma C.,

5 FLR 2089

(Terr. Ct. USVI, Nov.

16, 1978) discusses a situation remarkably similar in
facts to the present case.

In doing so, the Territorial

Court cited the Utah statute and practice regarding
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termination of parental rights.

The mother in that case

was also slightly mentally retarded.

The father was 69

and had just suffered an incapacitating massive heart
attack.

The court held:
"The facts before the court clearly and
convincingly establish that Mr. Gabino
C. and Mrs. Luz C. are not capable of
adequately parenting their minor children ...•
Without doubt, Mr. and Mrs. C. are incapable
of meeting the psychological, emotional,
and intellectual needs of their children.
At best, the C's can provide their three
daughters with no more than the basic
physical necessities of life." 5 FLR
2090. (Emphasis added.)

The court concluded that the conduct and condition of
the patents were seriously detrimental to the children,
and parental rights were terminated.

5 FLR at 2090.

The courts are recognizing that adequate parenting
involves more than simply providing basic survival care.
Appellant asserts that she had the capability to provide
basic survival care, without training,

(Appellant's

Brief, p.l4) but the record does not support such an
assertion.

Neither psychologist testified that appellant

could provide survival care without training, only that
she probably had the capacity to provide such care with
training.

(TR. 42,65).

When given instruction in basic

skills such as bathing, feeding, and bedtime, the appellant
did not respond with a convincing demonstration of her
ability to learn survival care.

But even if we assume
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that she can eventually learn the skills

necess~ry

to keep

a child alive, there has been little or no hope offered
that appellant would ever be able to provide her child
with anything more than basic survival care.

Dr. Furlong

testified that appellant did not have the ability to
provide the stimulation or training necessary for a child
to fit into society in a reasonably adequate fashion.
(TR. 44}.

Dr. Grow testified that the appellant was not

capable of learning more than basic survival skills.
(TR. 66).

With this type of prognosis, one wonders how

much training the Division of Family Services was expected
to provide, and for how many years, before coming to the
same concluslon -- that the appellant lacks the capacity
to provide adequate parenting to her daughter.
The Juvenile Court judge heard all the testimony,
considered all the facts presented, found that there had
been adequate attempts at instruction and training, and
that c.ppellant has made "no significant progress".
290).

(TR.

The trial court is in the best position to analyze

and find the facts, and as this court said in R.J., H.J.,
D.J., supra, "[t]he general rule that we will usually
defer to the trial court's factual findings, applies to
juvenile proceedings."

Dec. 15, 1978, p.2, fn.

State v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948 (Utah 1962}.

6, citing

As Justice

Crockett said in his dissenting opinion in State in tlte
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Interest of Walter B., supra:
[I]f this entire record is surveyed in
the light of the established rules of
review, allowing the Juvenile Court its
prerogative of finding the facts, and
of exercising its judgment as to the best
interest and welfare of this child, there
is no basis shown which should persuade
this Court to disturb the findings and
order made.
577 P.2d at 126.
In the present case, the record fully supports the
findings of the lower court that the Division of Family
Services attempted to allow the appellant to care for
her child and to train her to provide adequate parenting;
and that the appellant's unsatisfactory performance and
inability to learn, together with the child's best interests,
now require termination of parental rights.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONDUCT AND CONDITION MUST BE
ANALYZED IN CONNECTION h'ITH HER INDIVIDUAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH HER CHILD, AND NOT IN
TERMS OF A NATIONAL STATISTICAL CATEGORY.
Point III of appellant's brief sounds rather like the
age-old excuse a child gives his parent to justify some
\·lrongdoing.

"But Hom, everybody else does it!"

Appellant's argument seems to be that there are
statistically quite a number of people in the United
States who are at the same or lower intelligence level
as the appellant.

Many of those people may have children.

tlany may not be providing their children with the care
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and stimulation that would all01·7 them to thrive.
Brief, p. 17).

(Appellant'

However, appellant is an individual with

unique problems.

Her child is also an individual, and the

child also has some unique problems.

The task of the

Juvenile Court is to determine whether this mother's
conduct or condition is seriously
child.

detri~ental

to this

The fact that the court cannot solve all the

problems which may exist in homes around the country
should not prevent it from doing its best in this

particul~

case.
As Dr. Grow testified, the appellant's condition may
not be as common as her statistics indicate.

{Appellant's

full scale IQ is approximately at the 6th percentile
nationally, TR. 30).

Dr. Grow indicated that in judging

a person's parenting abilities, one must consider more
than her intellectual capacity alone.

The person may

have strenyths separate and apart from her intelligence
level which could enable her to be quite a satisfactory
parent.

(TR. 6 5) .

Many of the people in appellant's

statistical group who have approximately the same
intellectual capabilities may have many compensating
traits which allow them to care adequately for their
children.

These people have to be judged as individuals,

not simply as a member of

SO!'le

statistical group.
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However, Dr. Grow testified that he looked for
positive traits and strengths in Mary Ellen Lavine's
personality, and found them lacking.

(TR. 65,67).

Appellant not only suffers from slight mental
retardation and very limited learning capacity, she also
lacks compensating traits on the positive side of the
ledger.

In this way she may differ from many others in

the country with her same mental condition who are raising
children.

In examining the particulars of this case,

the Juvenile Court was justified in finding that this mother
could not adequately care for this child.
There may well be other failing families around the
country.

But when the courts of this state are presented

with an appropriate case for remedial action, they should
not hesitate merely because they are unable to remedy all
similar households.
abuse.

An analogy might be made to child

Child abuse is certainly not uncommon in this

country.

The courts are not able to convict all child

abusers.

However, when there is sufficient evidence to

convict one child abuser, the court does not hesitate to
do so.
In this case, the Juvenile Court was presented with
sufficient evidence to support termination of parental
rights as between this parent and this child.

The lower

court's decision should not be overturned on the grounds
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that similar problems may exist in other families.
POINT IV
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES WORKED ACTIVELY
TO BUILD AND IMPROVE APPELLANT'S PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIP BEFORE DECIDING TO PETITION FOR
TEru1INATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS.
The Division of Family Services worked with appellant
and her child for over four years.

Numerous visits were

arranged, and instruction was given on how to care for
the child.

(See Point II, supra).

Nonetheless, appellant

asserts in Point IV of her brief that the Division engaged
in a deliberate and calculated plan to destroy her relatio~
ship with her child.

There is absolutely no evidence in

the record of any deliberate, calculated plan, either
individually or as a conspiratorial scheme, to alienate
the child from the parent or the parent from the child.
This assertion rests solely on the fact that when Mr.
Gearhart was assigned to the case as a social worker,
she did not take active steps to arrange visits between
appellant and the child.

Visits were never denied to

the appellant, she just never asked for them.

(TR. 14 6, 147

Appellant is an adult claiming to have sufficient understanding, capacity, and desire to have full custody of
her child.

If such is the case, and if in fact she did

want to maintain relationship with the child and eventuull:
regain custody, she certainly should have requested
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visitation on her own, which she never did.
Ms. Gearhart did terminate the visits with the
grandparents.

The circumstances surrounding this matter

have already been discussed.

(See page 5 , supra).

Whether Ms. Gearhart's actions regarding the grandparents'
visits \vere proper is irrelevant for purposes of this
action.

Appellant's visitations were not contingent

upon the grandparents' visits.

So by terminating the

grandparents' visitation, Ms. Gearhart did nothing to
deny appellant the right to see her child.
Appellant puts too much emphasis on the fact that
she did not see her daughter for a year and a half.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 18).

Appellant's parental rights

were not terminated solely because she did not request
visits.

There were several factors which combined to

make her conduct and condition seriously detrimental to
the child.

(See Juvenile Court Order, TR. 289-292).

There is an underlying fallacy in much of appellant's
argument.

If at some point the Division of Family Services

did not make the decision that steps should be initiated
to terminate parental rights, no petition would ever get
filed.

It doesn't all happen on its own.

vlhen

~1rs.

Gearhart took over the case, she reviewed the record
and saw that no significant progress had been made by
appellant in caring for the child.

She was aware of
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appellant's mental condition and intelligence level which
indicated that it was unlikely that she would ever learn
adequate parenting skills.

She could see that appellant

had not responded well to instruction on basic survival
skills.

The child had never lived with appellant, had

been in the foster care program for several years, and
really had little to look forward to except more years
in foster care.

At that point r1s. Gearhart decided that

the interests of the child would best be served by initiati:'
some steps toward termination of parental rights.
In cases such as this, the Division of Family Services
must be concerned with two sets of interests--those of
the parent and those of the child.

The interests of the

parent should not be allowed to subvert those of the child.
In its most recent pronouncement on this. subject,
this court acknowledged that the interests of the child
should be paramount.

"Although courts are reluctant to

perform social surgery in permanently terminating the
natural parent-child relationship, the welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration."

State in Interest

of R.J., H.J., D.J., supra, Dec. 15, 1978, p.2.

(emphasis

added.)
This court has stated on many other occasions that thE
ultimate and most important test in a termination case must
be the interest and the welfare of the child, which cancer
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1

must outweigh any right or privilege of the natural
parent.

In the case of State v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948, 949,

(Utah, 1962), the court said:
"Quite beyond and more important than the
rights and privileges of the parents is
the welfare of these children and their
prospects for becoming well-adjusted, selfsustaining individuals.
This is the consideration of paramount importance."
In the termination case of State in the Interest of Jennings,
432 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah, 1967), this court stated:
"While ordinarily the parents have a right
to the custody of their children, the State
also has an interest in the welfare of
children, which is paramount thereto."
In the termination case of State in the Interest of A, supra,
514 P.2d at 797, 799

(Utah, 1973), this court stated:

"While one feels deeply for a parent who
is deprived of a child that feeling must
not overcome the duty placed upon the
court to act in the best interest of the
child."
In the termination case of In re Interest of Winger,
558 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah, 1976) this court stated:
"There is a presumption of great strength,
that it is in the best interests of the child
to be reared by its natural parents.
This
presumption is only overcome when the trier
of facts is convinced by a preponderance of
the evidence the welfare of the child requires
termination."
Finally, in the termination case of In re the Interest of
S.J., H.J. and S.J., 576 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah, 1978),
this court stated:
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"It was also fair and reasonable to further
conclude that the rights of the parents were
secondary in importance since they were in
direct conflict with and contrary to the
best interest of the children."
In the present case, the decision to petition for
termination of parental rights was made in consideration
of the best interests of the child after long term efforts
had been made to aid the natural mother.

There was nothing

irresponsible or inappropriate in the actions taken by the
Division of Family Services, which must protect the child's
interests as well as those of a parent.
POINT V
THE MINOR CHILD, P.L.L., HAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED RIGHT TO THE PRESERVATION OF IT'S BEST
INTEREST.
Minor child P.L.L. was born out of wedlock on July 10,
1973.

(R.S).

It was born with a hole in its throat, a

cleft pallat, a possible hearing loss, a turned out right
foot, and an anticipated susceptability to respiratory
disease.

(TR. 46,70,118).

The child was kept in the

hospital where delivered for approximately two weeks for
tests.

(TR. 118).

The attending physician refused to

release the child to its natural mother because she was
not able to care for the baby.

(TR. 118).

Before the mothc

was released from the hospital a tubelegation was performec
(TR. 208).

The child 1vas placed temporarily in

shelter facility by the Division of Family

<JJ1

Serve~

emergenc
and

subsequently on order of the Juvenile Court placed in a
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foster home.

(TR. 195).

The child has been in the same

foster home ever since for a period of over five years.
(TR. 195).

The child is in an adoptable status and it

would be possible for the foster parents to adopt it.
(TR. 194,195).

The child has been under the continuous

legal custody and guardianship of the Division of Family
Services.

The physical problems have been repaired in

a series of surgical operations and at the present time
the child appears both physically and mentally active and
normal with only some speech difficulty.

(TR. 163). There

was no evidence that the child's parents have contributed
anything to the support or care of the child.

The Juvenile

Court has continued custody in the Division of Family
Services on findings that the mother is unable to care for
the child.

(See orders of January 21, 1975, R. 18; January

20, 1976, R. 19; March 22, 1977, R. 36).

The mother is

not asking for restoration of custody in this proceeding.
(TR. 239).

There have been prolonged periods of time

during which the mother has neither requested nor had
contact with the child.

(TR. 132,150,156,163,210).

The mother has changed residences frequently and for a time
was unlocatable.
of employment.

(TR. 163,176).

She has had several places

(TR. 165,247) and is uncertain as to the

sources of her income.

(TR. 229).

She was on welfare

until eligible for social security income from a deceased
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husband.

(TR. 235) .

She has an older child (age 6)

living

with her parents in Nebraska, city or address unknown.
(TR. 200,242). This child has lived with her parents and
been in their continuous care since 10 months of age.
(TR. 2 4 2) .

She has never, during that time, at tempb"d

care or physical custody of said child.

(TR. 242).

child prefers to live with the grandparents.
Professional testimony was introduced

Said

(TR. 247).

that the mother is

mentally retarded with a very inadequate personality (TR.
55) , that she lacks mental capacity to improve her parentin:

I
1

ability (TR. 57), and that although she might be able to

~

provide basic survival care for the child P.L.L. the child

I

would not thrive or be adequately stimulated.

j

42,49).

(TR. 35,36,

There was testimony regarding her neglect and

inability to care for the child P.L.L.
of visitation.

(TR. 87).

during periods

The guardian ad litem appointed

by the Juvenile Court to protect the interest of the child
recommended termination of the mother's parental rights.
(R.

37).

Under these circumstances it seems obvious that
continuation of appellant's parental ties, thus preventing
a permanent placement and adoption of P.L.L., would not
be in the child's best interest.

The evidence

demonstrat~

that both the past conduct and the condition (circumstance
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of the appellant have been and are seriously detrimental
to the child P.L.L. and render the appellant unfit and
incompetent as a parent to said child.

(Section 78-32-

48(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, Replacement Volume 9A).
It is respondent's position that not only have
the statutory requisites been met for termination, but
further, under these circumstances, the child P.L.L. has
a constitutional right to be cut adrift from the appellant's
parental ties.
It should be noted that a proceeding in the Juvenile
Court is in the interest of the juvenile - not the parent,
nor the state, nor

so~e

other party,

The petition and all

subsequent court documents shall be entitled: "State of
Utah, in the interestof ___,a person under eighteen years
of age."

(Section 78-3a-23, U.C.A. 1953, Replacement

Volume 9A).

It is the duty of the trial court, and the

appellant court, to act in the best interest of the child,
not the adult parent.
at page 799).

(State in the Interest of A, supra,

Admittedly, there is a presumption that it

is in the best interest of the child to be reared by its
natural parents - but this is a rebuttable presumption
and can be overcome when the trier of the fact is convinced
by a preponderence of the evidence that the welfare of
the child requires termination.

In re Winger, supra.
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There is seldom reluctance to terminate parental ties
in order to protect a child's physical well being. There
is little hesitation to sever biological bonds if there is
neglect or abuse,and it is not difficult to affirm the
unfitness of a parent quilty of such conduct.
inimical

But equally

to a child may be the trauma and emotional

injury triggered by the termination of non-biological
parental tics formed in early years.

Such an intfc:t:ruption,

especially where no reassertion of custody by the natural
parent is possible, should likewise justify a termination
of the biological tie.

Unlike adults, children have no

sophisticated concept of blood-tie relationships until
quite late in ':heir development.

A blood-tie legal

preference is rather obscure and means nothing to a child
who has formed bonds with another parent figure who is
providing love and care.
the

psycholo~ical

It is a mistake to subordinate

well being of the child to an adult's

non possessory assertion of biological preference.

For

young children under age of 5 every disruption of continuit
affects any achievements attained and may completely
reverse the child's successful pattern.

(See Drs. Goldste:

Freud and Solint, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child,
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973).

In light of P.L.L.',

fragile beginning it would seem tragic to either transfer
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the child from a successful placement to a rather
marginal environment and frightening prospect in the
custody of appellant, or to shut the door to any permanent
adoptive circumstance in a stable surrounding.
Many courts have raised the psychological-parent
concept to a constitutional base and dictated that a
child whose placement is in question is entitled to
the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding his growth and development.
of

In re Roy, N.Y. Fam. Ct.

~.Y.

In the case

Cty., 4/5/77, 3 FLR

2380, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515, the court held a natural mother's
possessory claim to a 16 year old son who has lived with
foster parents since one year old, is severed by such
an "extraordinary circumstance", which circumstance
triggers the best interest rule and authorizes the boys
adoption by foster parent.

Of particular interest in

relation to instant case is following language of the
court:
"His biological mother is not seeking
his return to her; her claim is that-she
can maintain her title to him -- that
she can prevent his adoption and the
termination of her right to call herself
a parent ... "
"For this court to refuse to consider the
child's best interest because of an adult's
title to him, albeit a biological parent's,
seemingly would be unconstitutional. To
preclude a person by virtue of his birth
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from a benefit -- from a measure promoting
his interests -- would be anomaly in constitutional law . . . . the minor has an
unequivocal and unquestionable interest
in termination of hi~ parent's title to
him, and therefore he seemingly has a
constitutional right to freedom from the
parental possessory claim"
In re J.S.R., D.C. Ct. App., 5/26/77, 3 FLR 2500, it
held that in a termination proceeding the "best interest
of the child" test was not unconstitutionally vague and
that the standard requires the trial court to find the
"least detrimental alternative available for the child."
"We think it plain that the standard
'best interest of the child' requires the
judge, recognizing human frailty and man's
limitations with respect to forecasting
the future course of human events, to make
an informed and rational judgment, free
of bias and favor, as to the least detrimental or the available alternatives."
The integration of a child into a viable family
unit is more important to the child than maintaining a
non-custodial natural parent-child relationship.
case of State v. Blum,

In the

(Or. App. 1970), 463 P.2d 367,

which was cited with approval by this court in the case
of In re Winger, supra, the Oregon Appeals Court, under a
deprivation statute identical to ours, affirmed an order
that parental rights of a mentally ill mother could be
terminated upon finding
of

lh~t

she was unfit by reason

conditions seriously detrimental to the child.

court stated:

The
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"It is important that the child have
a sense of belonging to a family.
This
is one of the things we look for after we
say that our prime consideration is the best
interests of the child.
It is not in the
best interest of the child to keep him
forever in a limbo--a limbo that is
terminated, if at all, when on some
uncertain date his mentally ill mother
recovers and gives him a normal mother's
care. For this child it may well be
that at his present age of seven and onehalf years it is already too late to successfully integrate him into a family.
If it
is not too late, it is important to get it
done soon." (463 P. 2d, p. 370).
In the case of Organization of Foster Families v.
Dumpson, 418 F.Supp. 277

(1976), certain foster parents

attempted to restrain the New York City Human Resources
Administration from transferring foster children without
affording a constitutionally appropriate fair hearing,
claiming that both the foster children and the foster
parents enjoyed a familial right to privacy similar to
that recognized in a biological family relationship
because of the psychological ties which had been formed,
which was protected under both the Equal Protection and
Due Process clauses of the

~ourteenth

Amendment.

The

Federal District Court agreed with the foster parents
recognizing that the minor children had a constitutionally
protected "liberty interest to familial privacy"; viz.,
a constitutional right to the preservation of the least
restrictive familial relationship which can not be deprived
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without due process.

On appeal to the United States

Supreme Court (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431

u.s. 816, 87 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), the

Supreme Court recognized that "the importance of the
familial relationship to the individuals involved stems
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimae:
of daily association, and from the role it plays in
promoting a way of life through the instruction of
children, as well as from the fact of blood relationship."
(97 S.Ct. at page 2110).

Further the court recognized

that " ... emotional ties between foster parent and foster
child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in
some as close as those existing in biological families."
(97 S.Ct., footnote 52 at page 2110).
The following language of the Dumpson court is
relevant and significant:
"The time has long since passed when children
were considered mere chattels of the adults
with whom they lived . . . . lt lS by now wellsettled that children are 'persons; wlthln
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment whose
rights are entitled to protection agalnst
state abridgement. (Authorities omitted)
Foremost among those rights, as the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held, is the right to be
heard before being 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss'". (Authorities omitted) 418
F.Supp. 282 (Emphasis added).
Of special interest in regard protection of the child
in termination cases are two recent cases, one from the
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State of New Mexico and one from the State of California.
In the case of New Mexico Health and Social Services Dept.
v. Smith, N.M. Ct.App., l/9/79, 5 FLR 2346, the New Mexico
appeals court affirmed a judgment terminating parental
rights of child who had been in foster care for 2 of its
2 l/2 year life on the grounds that she was "unable to
discharge her natural responsibilities as a parent due to
mental incapacity, hospitalization, incarceration periods
and the use of alcohol."

A termination statute, similar

to ours, was involved which required a finding that the
parent was unfit resulting in serious harm to the child.
The trial court did not rule that the child suffered
physical harm but found that there was mental and emotional
harm as a result of the failure of the mother to perform
the natural obligation of care and support.

The consequence

of the mother's failure was the absence of a parent-child
relationship.

In other words, absence

of a parent-child

relationship constitutes serious harm sufficient to justify
termination of parental rights.

So in our instant case,

absence of a parent-child relationship between the appellant
and P.L.L. as a result of appellant's inability or lack
of interest in providing care and support of the child
renders the mother unfit and justifies termination of her
parental rights.

In the case of In re Heidi T., Cal. Ct. App.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1st Dist., 12/27/78, 5 FLR 2350, it was held that the
mother's continuing mental illness which rendered her
incapable of providing support justified termination
of parental rights regarding two children, 12 and 11,
who had been in foster care for ten years.
1979 is the ''International Year of the Child"
as designated by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.

This year commemorates the 20th Anniversary

of the Unlted Nations Declaration of the Rights of the
Child.

Privilege 2 of said Declaration provides as

follows:
The child shall enjoy special protection,
and shall be given opportunities and facilities,
by law and by other means, to enable him to
develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritual}
and socially in a healthy and normal manner and
in conditions of freedom and dignity.
In the
enactment of laws for this purpose the best
interest of the child shall be the paramount
consideration.
It is not argued that a United Nations Declaration
of Principle establishes a constitutional right.

It is

suggested, however, that to deny the least restrictive
alternative for P.L.L. to develop in a manner described
in said principle shall deprive P.L.L. of the liberty
vouchsafed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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CONCLUSION
It is acknowledged that termination of parental
rights is an extreme action to be very carefully considered.
The seriousness of the circumstance should not, however,
becloud the essentiality of the procedure when appropriate.
The Legislature has recognized that termination may well
be the proper action by authorizing such procedure.
In view of the importance of the matter this court
has in a series of recent cases spelled out certain tests
that should be followed in applying the statutory language.
The tests are as follows:
l.

The termination order must be supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.

(In re the Interest of

Winger, supra, 1975).
2.

The natural parent is unable to supply physical

and emotional care for the child.
3.

(Ibid.)

This circumstance will continue beyond a time

in which the child could otherwise be integrated into a
suitable substitute horne.
4.

(Ibid.)

The conduct and condition of the natural parent

is a substantial departure from normal parental relationships.
5.
action.

(State in the Interest of Walter B., supra, 1978).
The parent must be advised of appropriate remedial
(Ibid.)
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6.

The social agency must render reasonable efforts

of assistance.
7.

(Ibid.)

It must be clearly manifest that the parent

cannot or will not correct the deficiencies which exist.
(State in the Interest of E.B., 578 P.2d 831,
8.

(Utah, 1978)).

The termination must be in the best interest of

the child.

(State in the Interest of R.J., H.J. D.J.,

supra, 1978).
Without belaboring further argument it appears
obvious that the preponderance of the evidence supports
all of these tests.

It would seem to be an effort in

futility, and certainly not in the interest of the child
to return the child to appellant for some sort of trial
period.

The die has been cast.

The essential thing now

is to conclude a permanent placement that will continue
to affort P.L.L. prospect for becoming a well-adjusted,
self-sustaining individual.

This should now be the

consideration of paramount importance.

The order of the

Juvenile Court should be affirmed.
Dated this 9th day of March, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorneys General
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